Transformations in the Philosophy of Surveillance: From Michel Foucault’s Disciplinary Society to Zygmunt Bauman’s Control Society

Abstract

Twentieth-century philosophers and sociologists have focused extensively on defining human behavior as it emerges from the norms and regulations established by power. This focus reveals the profound relationship between knowledge and politics, wherein philosophy plays a primary role in analyzing the principles that legitimize these laws and identifying theories through which individual conduct can be refined. Surveillance emerges as a core function of power used to define such behavior, a theme that occupied Michel Foucault throughout his philosophical works, most notably in Discipline and Punish. However, it can be argued that Foucault’s conception of surveillance remained confined within the framework of solid modernity, manifested in the prison, the school, and the hospital. In these spaces, power operates through disciplinary rules driven by hidden forces, aiming not merely for punishment but for discipline; the mere knowledge of being watched compels the individual to self-regulate.

The distinction arises with Zygmunt Bauman regarding the nature of surveillance, as each philosopher’s view is rooted in a different stage of modernity. While Foucault is characterized by solid modernity, Bauman is defined by flexibility within his liquid philosophy. In Bauman’s framework, the criteria of power shift toward speed, transformation, and instability, byproducts of the digital revolution. This digital shift dictates the nature of contemporary surveillance, shaping its technological, social, and political dimensions. Whereas Foucault’s model posits the State and central authority as the observers, Bauman’s model describes a mutual or synoptic surveillance among individuals via social media, as well as by corporations using algorithms to track and define consumption patterns.